Healthcare business law · Updated
Who can own a medical practice in the District of Columbia?
We found no District of Columbia statute, court decision or Board of Medicine policy that bars a lay-owned LLC or business corporation from owning a medical practice, and none that expressly allows it. A professional corporation is closed to lay owners: no one may be a shareholder, director or officer unless "licensed to render a professional service for which the corporation is organized" (D.C. Code § 29-508). That chapter leaves practice "through the use of any form of business organization" alone (§ 29-503), and an LLC "may have any lawful purpose." The Health Occupations Revision Act regulates the act instead: no "person", a word it defines to include a corporation, may practice medicine unlicensed, and practicing medicine includes "Maintaining an office" for examining patients. The Board's 2014 med spa policy, "not mandatory", sets director and on-site duties rather than an ownership test.
DPS Law’s attorney is licensed in North Carolina only. This page summarizes District of Columbia law as of November 17, 2026, with the statutes and rules it relies on linked below. It is general information, not legal advice; for a District of Columbia matter, talk to a lawyer licensed in District of Columbia.
| Who | May own the medical practice? | Where the rule comes from |
|---|---|---|
| Physician licensed in the District | Yes, alone or with other physicians, including as a shareholder of a professional corporation, who need not have "a present or future employment relationship" with it | D.C. Code § 29-508(b), (c) |
| Physician licensed only in another state | Not stated in the statute. Shareholders must be licensed to render the corporation's service, and a "license" is the authority "required by law as a condition precedent to the rendering of professional service within the District"; in our reading, plan on a District license | § 29-502(1); § 29-508(b) |
| Advanced practice registered nurse, including a nurse practitioner | No District source addresses APRN ownership. APRN practice is "the independent performance of advanced-level nursing actions", and the protocol and collaboration sections are repealed; in our reading, an APRN may own a practice limited to APRN services | § 3-1201.02(2); § 3-1206.03 |
| Physician assistant | No District source addresses PA ownership. PAs practice "in collaboration with a licensed physician or osteopath"; in our reading, a PA is not eligible for shares in a medical professional corporation, whose shareholders must be licensed for "the same professional service" | § 3-1201.02(13); § 29-502(2) |
| Lay investor in a professional corporation | No. A share transfer to anyone not eligible "shall be void", and so is a voting trust or proxy given to anyone but another shareholder | § 29-511(a); § 29-509 |
| Lay investor in an LLC or business corporation that runs the practice | Not addressed by any District source we found. An LLC "may have any lawful purpose", and the professional corporation chapter leaves other business forms alone; but no unlicensed "person", corporations included, may practice medicine, which includes "Maintaining an office" for examining patients | § 29-801.04; § 29-503; § 3-1201.01(11); § 3-1201.02(7)(A)(vi); § 3-1210.01 |
| Lay owner of a med spa | No ownership test in the Board's policy, whose definition of a med spa reaches "any entity, however organized"; the facility must employ a medical director, a clinical director and a site director, and the policy calls itself "not mandatory" | Board of Medicine Policy 15-02 (Nov. 13, 2014) |
| Question | District of Columbia | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Is there a corporate practice of medicine rule? | None found by name in a statute, court decision or Board policy. The licensing act bars an unlicensed "person", defined to include a corporation, from practicing, and the practice of medicine includes "Maintaining an office or other place" for examining patients | § 3-1210.01; § 3-1201.01(11); § 3-1201.02(7)(A)(vi) |
| Professional corporation statute | Professional Corporation Act of 2010, D.C. Code §§ 29-501 to 29-516 (D.C. Law 18-378, July 2, 2011). Shareholders, directors and officers licensed; the secretary of a one-shareholder corporation need not be | Title 29, Chapter 5; § 29-508(b) |
| Other business forms | The professional corporation chapter does not affect any right "permitting or not prohibiting" professional services "through the use of any form of business organization". An LLC "may have any lawful purpose"; no subchapter of the LLC Act is about professional services | § 29-503; § 29-801.04; Title 29, Chapter 8 |
| Who practices medicine: the courts' test | Exercising medical judgment about individual patients. Work that "affects, influences, or even substantially impacts the treatment a patient will receive" is not the practice of medicine without it | Corporation Counsel opinion, June 21, 1999, reading Joseph (1991) and Morris (1997) |
| Fee splitting and referral payments | Grounds for discipline: paying anything of value, or splitting fees for professional services, with "any person for bringing or referring a patient". Sanctions include a civil fine of up to $5,000 per violation | § 3-1205.14(a)(14), (c) |
| Percentage management fees | No District statute or Board policy found on them. The text of the Board's Standards of Conduct rule, 17 DCMR 4612, could not be read on November 17, 2026 | Board policies; 17 DCMR Chapter 46 list |
| Medicaid referral payments | A misdemeanor (fine of up to $500, up to one year's imprisonment, or both, per violation) to solicit, accept, offer or pay "any type of remuneration" for referring a recipient or recommending an item the District of Columbia Medicaid Program pays for | § 4-802(a), (c), (d) |
| Nurse practitioner practice | "the independent performance of advanced-level nursing actions"; the old "Requirements of protocols" and "Collaboration" sections are repealed | § 3-1201.02(2); § 3-1206.03 |
| Med spas | Board Policy 15-02 (Nov. 13, 2014): neurotoxins, fillers and the lasers it lists are the practice of medicine; a medical director present at least 50 percent of weekly hours and a site director present at all hours. "Not mandatory" until the Board adopts rules, and the Chapter 46 rule list shows no med spa section | Policy 15-02; 17 DCMR Chapter 46 list |
| Office surgery | An "office-based facility" where ambulatory surgery is performed falls within the licensure act's definition of an ambulatory surgical facility | § 44-501(a)(1A) |
Where the District's rule comes from
The District has no corporate practice statute by that name, and we found no court decision or Board of Medicine policy that adopts the doctrine. What it has is a trace of one in its corporation law. The Professional Corporation Act of 2010 defines a "professional service" as one which, by "law, custom, standards of professional conduct or practice in the District before December 10, 1971, could not be rendered by a corporation", and it lists the services of "health professionals" among them (D.C. Code § 29-502(3)). The same chapter then says it "shall not alter or affect any existing or future right or privilege permitting or not prohibiting performance of professional services through the use of any form of business organization" (§ 29-503), and a District LLC "may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for profit" (§ 29-801.04).
The licensing statute is where the risk sits. Under the Health Occupations Revision Act, "No person shall practice, attempt to practice, or offer to practice a health occupation" unless licensed or exempt (§ 3-1210.01); a "person" means "an individual, corporation, trustee, receiver, guardian, representative, firm, partnership" and other bodies (§ 3-1201.01(11)); and the practice of medicine includes "Maintaining an office or other place for the purpose of examining persons afflicted with disease, injury, or defect of body or mind" (§ 3-1201.02(7)(A)(vi)). In our reading, a company owned by people who are not physicians that maintains a District office for examining patients in its own name is exposed under those words, though no District source we found has applied them to an owner. In our reading, the safer arrangement under that clause has the physician-owned practice maintain the office where patients are examined, with a company owned by others only leasing it the space and supplying staff.
Washington has also seen lay employment of physicians reach the Supreme Court, as an antitrust case. In American Medical Association v. United States (January 18, 1943), the Court affirmed the convictions of the AMA and the Medical Society of the District of Columbia for conspiring to restrain the business of Group Health Association, which the syllabus describes as a nonprofit corporation organized by government employees and "employing full-time physicians on a salary basis". The Court called Group Health "a membership corporation engaged in business or trade" (317 U.S. 519). Its review was limited to three antitrust and labor questions, and it did not decide whether Group Health practiced medicine.
The professional corporation: licensees only, and void transfers
The professional corporation is the only District entity we found with a licensee-only rule: "A person shall not be a shareholder, director, or officer of a professional corporation or render professional services on its behalf unless the person is an individual licensed to render a professional service for which the corporation is organized" (§ 29-508(b)). The definition limits shareholders to individuals "duly licensed to render the same professional service as the corporation" (§ 29-502(2)). Two further details of § 29-508 shape the shareholder group. If the corporation has only one shareholder, "the secretary of the corporation need not be licensed". And nothing in the chapter requires a shareholder "to have a present or future employment relationship with the corporation or actively to participate" in its work (§ 29-508(c)).
Outsiders are kept out by voids. A transfer of shares to anyone not eligible "shall be void" (§ 29-511(a)). A shareholder "shall not enter into a voting trust, proxy, or any other arrangement" giving voting power to anyone other than another shareholder of the same corporation, "and any such voting trust, proxy, or other arrangement shall be void" (§ 29-509). If pledged shares are executed upon, "the sole right of the creditor" is to have the corporation redeem them within 60 days of a written demand (§ 29-511(e)), and every share certificate carries a legend citing the Professional Corporation Act of 2010 (§ 29-511(d)). A professional who takes a public office that bars the work, or is otherwise disqualified by law, "immediately shall sever all employment relationships in which the individual shares in the corporation's profits" from services rendered after that point (§ 29-513).
The articles of incorporation state that each original shareholder and director "is licensed to render a professional service" (§ 29-506); the section calls for no certificate from the Board of Medicine. The license that counts is the authority "required by law as a condition precedent to the rendering of professional service within the District" (§ 29-502(1)). In our reading, a physician licensed only in Maryland or Virginia should hold a District license, or fit a District exemption, before taking shares.
Nurse practitioners and physician assistants
District nurse practitioners practice on their own license. The statute defines advanced practice registered nursing as "the independent performance of advanced-level nursing actions, with or without compensation" by a registered nurse certified by a national certifying body (§ 3-1201.02(2)), lets an APRN "perform actions of medical diagnosis, treatment, prescription, recommendation" (§ 3-1206.01(a)), and shows the former "Requirements of protocols" and "Collaboration" sections as repealed (§§ 3-1206.02, 3-1206.03). The definition of medicine adds that nothing in it restricts APRNs "from performing their duties as advanced practice registered nurses" (§ 3-1201.02(7)(C)). We found no District statute or policy on APRN ownership. In our reading, an APRN may therefore own a practice offering APRN services, alone or in a professional corporation of APRNs, because § 29-502(2) asks only that shareholders be licensed for "the same professional service as the corporation"; by the same test, an APRN cannot hold shares in a corporation organized to practice medicine.
Physician assistants stand differently. "Practice by physician assistants" means the performance, "in collaboration with a licensed physician or osteopath", of diagnosis, treatment, prescription and other functions "authorized by the Board of Medicine" (§ 3-1201.02(13)). No District statute or Board policy we read addresses PA ownership, and the sections of Title 29, Chapter 5 we read pair physicians with no other licensee. In our reading, the "same professional service" test of § 29-502(2) leaves no room for a PA shareholder in a medical professional corporation, and a practice a PA owns still needs the physician collaboration the definition requires. The Board's PA rules in 17 DCMR Chapter 49 were not read: dcregs.dc.gov serves their section titles, not their text, to automated reading.
Management companies: the Morris test and the referral rules
For a management company, the most useful District authority is about who practices medicine, not who owns. In a formal opinion of June 21, 1999, the Corporation Counsel read two District of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions, Joseph v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine (1991) and Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine (1997). In Morris the court rejected the Board's view that a Blue Cross medical director practiced medicine because his work influenced patients' care: "Conduct that merely 'affects,' 'influences,' or 'substantially impacts' on the course of such care by others cannot itself be treatment" (Corporation Counsel opinion, quoting 701 A.2d at 367). The opinion's summary: work that "affects, influences, or even substantially impacts the treatment a patient will receive is not the practice of medicine unless the person is also engaged in the exercise of medical judgment with respect to individual patients".
The 1999 opinion drew the line for Department of Health officials: those whose duties "solely involve the development or interpretation of policy, the establishment of procedures, or the direction of programs, without direct or indirect patient care" need no medical license, while those with "a voice in making judgments concerning the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of medical conditions of individual patients" do. In our reading, an MSO's billing, staffing and lease work sits on the first side of that line, and anyone at the company who weighs in on individual patients' care needs a District medical license.
On fees, the District's statute targets referral payments, not the form of a fee. The Board may discipline a licensee who "Pays or agrees to pay anything of value to, or to split or divide fees for professional services with, any person for bringing or referring a patient" (§ 3-1205.14(a)(14)), and the sanctions include a civil fine "not to exceed $5,000 for each violation" (§ 3-1205.14(c)). For Medicaid patients, § 4-802 makes it a misdemeanor, with a fine of up to $500, up to a year's imprisonment, or both for each violation, to solicit, accept, offer or pay "any type of remuneration" for referring a recipient or recommending anything the District of Columbia Medicaid Program pays for (§ 4-802). We found no District statute or Board policy on percentage-of-revenue management fees. The text of the Board's Standards of Conduct rule, 17 DCMR 4612, could not be read on November 17, 2026, so check it before agreeing to a percentage fee.
Med spas: Board Policy 15-02 and the 2006 salon ruling
The District's med spa rules come from a Board of Medicine policy, not a regulation. Policy No. 15-02, the Policy on the Practice of Aesthetic Medicine (November 13, 2014), sorts aesthetic work into three levels (Policy 15-02). Level I services, such as superficial peels, facials and waxing, "do not constitute the practice of medicine". Level II (non-ablative lasers and intense pulsed light for hair removal or skin, radiofrequency skin tightening, non-invasive body contouring) and Level III (ablative and vaporizing lasers, botulinum toxins, tissue fillers, sclerotherapy, tattoo removal, liposuction) "constitute the practice of medicine" and "may be performed only as part of a medical practice", whatever the business calls itself.
A facility that does Level II or III work "shall employ a medical director, a clinical director, and a site director, which may be the same person". The medical director must be physically present at least 50 percent of the facility's weekly hours of operation, and the site director, a practitioner employed full-time, must be "physically present in the facility during all hours of operation" or designate "an equally qualified substitute". The policy calls itself "directive in nature and not mandatory" until the Board adopts med spa regulations, and the Board's Chapter 46 rule list on dcregs.dc.gov showed no med spa section on November 17, 2026 (Chapter 46 list). Ownership is not its test: its definition of a med spa starts with an entity "owned by, or an organization of which the majority shares are held by, a physician(s) licensed in the District", then reaches "any entity, however organized, and whether or not conducted for profit".
Two other points shape a District med spa. In Policy No. 06-004 (June 2006) the Board "determined that a physician may administer Botox injections in a cosmetology salon" (Policy 06-004). And the statute counts as medicine "any type of invasive procedure of the body" that affects "the layer of skin below the stratum corneum" for "cosmetic purposes", while allowing other health professionals to perform such a procedure if it "Has been authorized by a licensed physician", or if a listed licensee with the necessary training and experience performs it, such as an APRN, a physician assistant or a registered nurse (§ 3-1201.02(7)(A)(iv), (B)).
How the District compares with North Carolina
Where North Carolina's Medical Board requires a business practicing medicine to be "owned in their entirety by persons holding active North Carolina licenses", and says it "may seek injunctive relief against lay owners of businesses engaged in the corporate practice of medicine" (NCMB position statement 10.1.2, amended September 2025), the District's Board of Medicine has no such statement among the eleven documents on its policy list. The only licensee-only ownership rule we found in District law is § 29-508, which binds professional corporations and, by § 29-503, leaves LLCs and other forms alone; the District's open question is instead the licensing act's "Maintaining an office" clause, which no District source we found has applied to an owner.
On fees the gap is wider. North Carolina's Board says "a licensee cannot share revenue on a percentage basis with a non-licensee" and "To do so is fee splitting and is grounds for disciplinary action" (NCMB position statement 10.1.1, amended September 2021). The District's ground for discipline reaches fees split "for bringing or referring a patient". North Carolina applies its licensee-ownership rule to the medical side of a med spa; the District's 2014 policy sets director and on-site duties without an ownership rule. See who can own a med spa in North Carolina, or the District's neighbors, Maryland and Virginia.
Check a management fee for a District of Columbia practice
Compare a flat fee, cost plus a markup and a percentage of collections, and see which District of Columbia and federal rules bear on the one you are considering. The figures stay in your browser.
What the rules say about this structure
District of Columbia rules
D.C. Code § 3-1205.14(a)(14): no payment or fee split for bringing a patient
The Board of Medicine may discipline a licensee who "Pays or agrees to pay anything of value to, or to split or divide fees for professional services with, any person for bringing or referring a patient" (§ 3-1205.14(a)(14)). The sanctions include a civil fine "not to exceed $5,000 for each violation" (§ 3-1205.14(c)). Unlike § 4-802, which is tied to the District's Medicaid program, this ground names no payer. In our reading, the words "for bringing or referring a patient" fit a marketing fee paid per new patient, or a share of fees that climbs with the patients the MSO delivers; a set price for the advertising work itself pays for the work, not the patient.[1]
District of Columbia: no statute or Board policy on percentage management fees found
Neither the Health Occupations Revision Act's discipline and practice sections nor any of the eleven documents on the Board of Medicine's policy list limits a management fee set as a percentage of a practice's collections. The fee-splitting ground in § 3-1205.14(a)(14) reaches fees split "for bringing or referring a patient", not management fees as such. The text of the Board's Standards of Conduct rule, 17 DCMR 4612, could not be read on dcregs.dc.gov. In our reading, a District percentage fee is tested twice: under (a)(14), by whether it pays for patients brought in, and under the Morris test the 1999 Corporation Counsel opinion describes, by who exercises medical judgment.[1][10][11][9]
D.C. Code § 4-802: remuneration for Medicaid referrals is a misdemeanor
For care paid by the District of Columbia Medicaid Program, "No one may solicit, accept, or agree to accept any type of remuneration" for referring a recipient to a particular provider, or for recommending the purchase, lease or order of any good, facility, service or item the program pays for (§ 4-802(c)), and no one may offer or pay it (§ 4-802(d)). Each violation is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $500, imprisonment of up to one year, or both (§ 4-802(a)). In our reading, either clause can reach an MSO: a fee that rises with the Medicaid recipients it refers, or pay tied to goods or services it recommends.[5]
Who practices medicine in the District: the office clause and the Morris test
No unlicensed "person", a word defined to include a corporation, may practice medicine (§§ 3-1210.01, 3-1201.01(11)), and the practice of medicine includes "Maintaining an office or other place for the purpose of examining persons afflicted with disease, injury, or defect of body or mind" (§ 3-1201.02(7)(A)(vi)). The Corporation Counsel's 1999 opinion, reading the Court of Appeals' Joseph and Morris decisions, said work that "affects, influences, or even substantially impacts the treatment a patient will receive is not the practice of medicine unless" the person also exercises medical judgment about individual patients. In our reading, a lay-owned MSO should lease the office to the practice and leave every clinical decision to its licensees.[4][2][3][9]
Professional corporations: lay transfers, proxies and voting trusts are void
If the District practice is a professional corporation, only individuals licensed to render its service may be shareholders, directors or officers (§ 29-508(b)). A share transfer to anyone not eligible "shall be void" (§ 29-511(a)), and so is any "voting trust, proxy, or any other arrangement" giving voting power to anyone but another shareholder of the same corporation (§ 29-509). If pledged shares are executed upon, "the sole right of the creditor" is redemption by the corporation within 60 days of a written demand (§ 29-511(e)). In our reading, an MSO's right to vote the physicians' shares, or to take them on a default, would not survive those sections.[6][7][8]
District of Columbia: no self-referral statute found in the sections read
Neither the Health Occupations Revision Act's list of grounds for discipline (§ 3-1205.14), nor § 4-802 in the Medicaid Provider Fraud Prevention chapter, nor the Board's policy list limits a practitioner's referrals to an entity the practitioner invests in or requires disclosing that interest. The Code site offered no full-text search we could use, so this is not a complete search. Where the practice pays the MSO's owners, through the fee or otherwise, for patients they send, § 3-1205.14(a)(14) reaches the licensee who pays, and § 4-802 reaches remuneration for Medicaid referrals.[1][5][10]
District of Columbia statutes (the Health Occupations Revision Act, the Medicaid fraud section and the Professional Corporation Act, code.dccouncil.gov), the Board of Medicine's policies and the Corporation Counsel's 1999 opinion, as they bear on a management fee between a District practice and a management company, read on November 17, 2026; the federal rules show for every state.
Sources for the District of Columbia notes
- D.C. Code § 3-1205.14(a)(14) and (c), Health Occupations Revision Act, grounds for disciplinary action (last amended by D.C. Law 25-191, July 19, 2024) (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 3-1201.01(11), definition of "person" (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 3-1201.02(7), definition of the practice of medicine (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 3-1210.01, practicing without license, registration, or certification (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 4-802(a), (c) and (d), Medicaid penalties and prohibited acts (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 29-508, qualifications of shareholders, director, and officer of a professional corporation (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 29-509, proxy prohibited (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 29-511, transfer of shares (as of November 17, 2026)
- Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, Department of Health programs and the license to practice medicine (June 21, 1999; oag.dc.gov), discussing Joseph (D.C. 1991) and Morris (D.C. 1997) (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Board of Medicine, guidelines, policies and position statements page (dchealth.dc.gov) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 17 DCMR Chapter 46, Medicine, section list (dcregs.dc.gov; rule text not served to automated reading) (as of November 17, 2026)
- D.C. Board of Medicine, Policy No. 15-02, Policy on the Practice of Aesthetic Medicine (Nov. 13, 2014) (as of November 17, 2026)
Federal rules
The Anti-Kickback Statute reaches federal program business
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute makes it a felony to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit or receive any remuneration to induce, or in return for, referrals or the arranging for or recommending of items or services for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care program. The criminal maximum is a $100,000 fine and 10 years in prison, and OIG may also impose a civil penalty of up to $127,973 per act, the 2025 level that HHS kept for 2026. A management fee is protected by the personal services and management contracts safe harbor only if it meets every condition, but OIG says failing one "does not render an arrangement automatically illegal"; the arrangement is then reviewed on "the totality of the facts and circumstances, including the intent of the parties."[1][2][3][4][5][7]
Signed writing, every service listed, one-year term
The safe harbor requires the agreement to be "set out in writing and signed by the parties", to cover and specify all of the services the MSO provides to the practice for the term, and to run for "not less than 1 year." OIG has said the writing can be one signed agreement or a signed collection of documents that together contain every required element. Its compliance guidance also asks whether the parties document the services they provide and whether arrangements "are actually conducted according to the terms of the written agreements."[5][6][7]
Fair market value and commercial reasonableness
The fee methodology must be "consistent with fair market value in arm's-length transactions", and the services contracted for may not exceed those "reasonably necessary to accomplish the commercially reasonable business purpose of the services." OIG has declined to define either term for the Anti-Kickback Statute and is barred by statute from opining on fair market value in an advisory opinion, so the figures in this estimator are not a fair market value finding. OIG's compliance guidance asks, "Is the determination of fair market value based upon a reasonable methodology that is uniformly applied and properly documented?", and in Advisory Opinion 25-03 the requestors certified each fee as consistent with fair market value "as established by a reputable, independent third-party valuator."[5][6][7][11]
A fixed fee is set in advance
A fixed fee for a written list of services is a compensation methodology set in advance, and because it does not change with the number of patients or the practice's collections, it does not move with referrals or business generated between the parties. In Advisory Opinion 25-03, OIG concluded that fees a practice would pay to a management services organization and the telehealth practice it manages would not generate prohibited remuneration, where the requestors certified that the fee methodology would be set in advance and consistent with fair market value, noting that paying the hourly fee "regardless of whether" the practice was reimbursed "decreases the likelihood" that the fee takes into account the volume or value of referrals or business generated between the parties. An advisory opinion protects only the parties that requested it, and a fixed fee still has to be consistent with fair market value for the services actually provided.[5][11]
Percentage fee and the volume-or-value condition
Since January 19, 2021, the safe harbor requires the compensation methodology, rather than the total amount, to be set in advance, so, in our reading, a percentage fixed in the signed agreement is not ruled out on that ground alone. The harder condition is that the methodology may not take into account "the volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties" that federal programs pay for, and a fee measured by collections rises with that business whenever the MSO or its owners help generate it. In 1998 OIG said percentage compensation for marketing services "may implicate" the statute and stated a "longstanding concern that percentage billing arrangements may increase the risk of upcoding and similar abusive billing practices." Missing the safe harbor is not itself a violation; the arrangement is then judged on its facts, including intent.[5][6][8][9][7]
Cost-plus: costs and markup fixed before payment
OIG said in its 2020 rule that an arrangement can fit the safe harbor "by using an hourly rate or other set, verifiable formula", but that whether an employee lease paid on "actual expenses incurred" meets the set-in-advance condition "would depend on the facts and circumstances." Parties must determine "whether the compensation methodology over the term of the agreement is set in advance before any payment under the arrangement is made", which in our reading means the cost categories, the markup and the way costs are verified belong in the signed agreement. OIG's example was that a bonus taking into account referrals between the parties, passed through as a cost, would leave the compensation unprotected, and the markup is part of the compensation that must be consistent with fair market value.[6][5]
Paying the MSO to bring in patients
The Anti-Kickback Statute reaches payment for "arranging for or recommending" federally payable items or services, not only for direct referrals, and OIG said in 1998 that percentage compensation for marketing services "may implicate" the statute. In 2022 OIG described a per-patient-encounter fee as a "per-click" fee structure, which "generally is inherently reflective of the volume or value of referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties." Measured against the safe harbor, a marketing fee fixed in advance for defined advertising work does not vary with the patients generated; a percentage or per-patient fee does.[1][8][10][5]
Fees between parties who refer to each other
When the MSO's owners or affiliates and the practice refer patients to each other, the management fee runs between parties who can generate federal program business for each other. OIG's compliance guidance asks, "Is the entity paying an inflated rate to a potential referral source?" and whether a party is "receiving free or below-market-rate items or services", so the fee can be questioned whether it sits above or below fair market value. The safe harbor also excludes a methodology that takes into account "the volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties"; a percentage of collections rises with the patients the owners send, while a fixed fee does not.[7][5]
Stark: physician owners and designated health services
Stark bars a physician who has a financial relationship with an entity, an ownership interest or a compensation arrangement, directly or through an immediate family member, from referring Medicare patients to it for designated health services such as clinical laboratory, radiology and imaging, physical therapy and outpatient prescription drugs, and bars the entity from billing for them, unless an exception applies. The entity is the one that performs or bills those services, usually the practice or an affiliate rather than a management-only MSO, and an ownership interest can run through an entity that owns the provider. Each element of an exception must be met; the personal service arrangements exception, for example, requires a signed writing specifying the services, a term of at least 1 year, and compensation "set in advance" that "does not exceed fair market value" and is not determined in any manner that takes into account "the volume or value of referrals or other business generated between the parties."[12][13][14]
General information for modeling management fee structures, not legal advice; whether a fee is consistent with fair market value is a question for a documented valuation of the services, not a calculator.
Sources for the federal notes
- 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b), the Anti-Kickback Statute (uscode.house.gov, current through Pub. L. 119-124) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a(a)(7), civil money penalty for kickbacks (uscode.house.gov, current through Pub. L. 119-124) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 45 CFR 102.3, inflation-adjusted civil money penalties (eCFR, up to date as of Nov. 13, 2026) (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS, No Adjustment to HHS Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts for 2026, 91 FR 66566 (Oct. 21, 2026) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 42 CFR 1001.952(d), personal services and management contracts safe harbor (eCFR, up to date as of Nov. 13, 2026) (as of November 17, 2026)
- OIG final rule amending the safe harbors, 85 FR 77684 (Dec. 2, 2020; effective Jan. 19, 2021) (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS-OIG, General Compliance Program Guidance (Nov. 6, 2023) (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS-OIG Advisory Opinion No. 98-4 (Apr. 15, 1998): management company paid costs plus a percentage of practice revenue (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS-OIG, Compliance Program Guidance for Third-Party Medical Billing Companies, 63 FR 70138 (Dec. 18, 1998; listed in OIG's CPG archive) (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS-OIG Advisory Opinion No. 22-09 (Apr. 25, 2022): per-patient-encounter fees (as of November 17, 2026)
- HHS-OIG Advisory Opinion No. 25-03 (June 6, 2025): fees to telehealth management services organizations (as of November 17, 2026)
- 42 U.S.C. 1395nn, physician self-referral (Stark) law (uscode.house.gov, current through Pub. L. 119-124) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 42 CFR 411.351, Stark definitions, including entity (eCFR, up to date as of Nov. 13, 2026) (as of November 17, 2026)
- 42 CFR 411.357(d), Stark personal service arrangements exception (eCFR, up to date as of Nov. 13, 2026) (as of November 17, 2026)
Compare District of Columbia with other states
Each colored state has its own page, read at that state's own sources.
- Lay investors may not own the medical practice
- Some forms barred, no broader rule found
- Lay ownership possible in some form
- Covered: read the details
- Not covered yet
Common questions
Can a non-doctor own a medical practice in Washington, DC?
Not a professional corporation: shares go only to licensees, and a transfer to anyone else "shall be void" (D.C. Code §§ 29-508, 29-511). For an LLC or business corporation we found no District statute, court decision or Board policy either way. In our reading, the safer structure keeps the practice physician-owned and puts the investor in a management company, because the licensing act counts "Maintaining an office" for examining patients as practicing medicine and reaches corporations.
Does DC have a corporate practice of medicine doctrine?
Not by name. The professional corporation act defines professional services, health professionals' services among them, as services that "could not be rendered by a corporation" in the District before December 10, 1971, but says it does not affect practice through "any form of business organization". The courts' test, as the Corporation Counsel read it in 1999, is whether a person exercises medical judgment about individual patients.
Can a nurse practitioner own a practice in DC?
No District source says so directly, but District law defines APRN practice as "the independent performance of advanced-level nursing actions", and its protocol and collaboration sections are repealed. In our reading, an APRN may own a practice that offers APRN services; a medical professional corporation stays limited to physicians.
Can a physician licensed in Maryland or Virginia own part of a DC professional corporation?
The statute requires shareholders "licensed to render a professional service for which the corporation is organized", and defines a license as the authority required to render that service "within the District" (§§ 29-508(b), 29-502(1)). In our reading, plan on a District license.
Does a DC med spa have to be owned by a doctor?
No District source we read says so. Board Policy 15-02 (November 13, 2014), which calls itself "not mandatory", treats neurotoxins, fillers and the lasers it lists as medicine, and requires a medical director on site at least half the weekly hours and a site director present at all hours or an equally qualified substitute.
Can a management company take a percentage of a DC practice's revenue?
We found no District statute or Board policy on percentage management fees. The statute disciplines a licensee who splits fees with "any person for bringing or referring a patient", so, in our reading, a fee that grows with the patients the company brings in is the risk. The Board's Standards of Conduct rule could not be read on November 17, 2026.
Update log
- November 17, 2026. Published. Covers the District's professional corporation act and LLC Act, the Health Occupations Revision Act's licensing, fee-splitting and nursing and PA provisions, the Medicaid kickback section, the Corporation Counsel's 1999 opinion on the Joseph and Morris decisions, the Supreme Court's 1943 Group Health Association case and the Board of Medicine's med spa and salon policies. Read at the source November 17, 2026: the D.C. Code sections cited (code.dccouncil.gov), Board Policies 15-02 and 06-004 and the Board's policy list (dchealth.dc.gov), the 1999 opinion (oag.dc.gov), 317 U.S. 519 (Library of Congress) and the NC Medical Board's position statements. The text of the Board's rules in 17 DCMR Chapters 46 and 49 could not be read on dcregs.dc.gov, which shows section titles only, so Board rules are not quoted.
Sources
- D.C. Code §§ 29-501 to 29-516, Professional Corporation Act of 2010 (D.C. Law 18-378, eff. July 2, 2011; Council of the District of Columbia, D.C. Law Library)
- D.C. Code § 29-502, definitions (amended by D.C. Law 19-210, Mar. 5, 2013)
- D.C. Code § 29-503, applicability
- D.C. Code § 29-506, incorporation
- D.C. Code § 29-508, qualifications of shareholders, director, and officer
- D.C. Code § 29-509, proxy prohibited
- D.C. Code § 29-511, transfer of shares
- D.C. Code § 29-513, disqualified professional
- D.C. Code § 29-801.04, nature, purpose, and duration of limited liability company
- D.C. Code § 3-1201.01, Health Occupations Revision Act definitions, (11) "person"
- D.C. Code § 3-1201.02, practice definitions, (2) advanced practice registered nursing, (7) medicine, (13) physician assistants (last amended by D.C. Law 26-105, Mar. 24, 2026)
- D.C. Code § 3-1205.14, grounds for disciplinary action, (a)(14) and (c) (last amended by D.C. Law 25-191, July 19, 2024)
- D.C. Code § 3-1206.01, advanced practice registered nurses, general authorization
- D.C. Code § 3-1206.03, collaboration (repealed)
- D.C. Code Title 3, Chapter 12, Subchapter VI, advanced registered nursing (section list showing §§ 3-1206.02 and 3-1206.03 repealed)
- D.C. Code § 3-1210.01, practicing without license, registration, or certification
- D.C. Code § 4-802, Medicaid penalties and prohibited acts
- D.C. Code § 44-501, health-care facility licensure definitions, (a)(1A) ambulatory surgical facility
- D.C. Board of Medicine, Policy No. 15-02, Policy on the Practice of Aesthetic Medicine (Nov. 13, 2014)
- D.C. Board of Medicine, Policy No. 06-004, Practice of Medicine Permitted in a Cosmetology Salon (June 2006)
- D.C. Board of Medicine, guidelines, policies and position statements page (list of eleven documents)
- 17 DCMR Chapter 46, Medicine, section list (dcregs.dc.gov; rule text not readable automatically)
- Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, Department of Health programs and the license to practice medicine (June 21, 1999), discussing Joseph v. D.C. Board of Medicine, 587 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1991) and Morris v. D.C. Board of Medicine, 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997)
- American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (Library of Congress copy of the U.S. Reports)
- NC Medical Board, Corporate Practice of Medicine, position statement 10.1.2 (adopted Mar. 2016, amended Sept. 2025)
- NC Medical Board, Referral Fees and Fee Splitting, position statement 10.1.1 (adopted Nov. 1993, amended Sept. 2021)
Related
Building a practice, MSO or med spa that reaches into the District of Columbia?
DPS Law structures North Carolina medical practices, med spas and the management companies that serve them.